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1Introduction
In the light of my wellnovn leanings toward consideration of qualitative
aspects of problems, itseems likely that my intended role in this dis-
cussion is that of devil'sadvocate, looking out for pitfallsand limit-
ations in the indicated type ofstudy,It is not only inductive, but the
central concept is quantitative,and lends itself to whatseems to be the
current trend toward construinginductive sti.dy as mainlyor exclusively
quantitative in character.As to this, non-quantitative inductive study
seems to me enormously important, and deserving ofall possible support
in an age increasingly devoted tostatistics.While tgrowtht is a purely
quantitative c oncept, the conditions ofgrowth do most emphatically include
qualitative elements.
It is less important how fastwe are grovring than whether our growth
is sound.Our economy can expand quantitatively, to the ruinof subsequent
generations, in a variety of ways, includingso il-mining and, what may be
more seriousthe erosion of the social-moral basis which isnowadays more
important than ever as a foundation foran economic system that will work.
In view of this, the focussing of the s.idyon a quantitative concept
ought to mean that we should take special precautions to keep ourselves
reminded that gr'tth is merely quantitative; and fight shy of naively
identifying it with qualitative prcress, ase used to do not long ago,
with what now seems ill-founded optimism.In talking of proved achieve-
ments, it is altogether fitting and proper to limitour claims in this way.
But it would be a calamity if we went on to speak and thinkas if the
quantitative facts were all we needed to know:if we forget to ask our-
selves the qualitative questions about these facts.Does our growth- 2t -
constitute progress?Is it of Soundand desirable quality?We need to keep
that questionconstantly beforeus, at thesame time thatwe resist the
temptation tothinkwe can give ita simple and categoricalanswer from the
quantitatjv evidencealone.
2What is Growth?
But ifprogress is an elusiveconcept, that does notmean that the more
tangible conceptof growth issimple and whollyunambiguous.It should be a
commonplace that growth,as measured by the economicdimensions of a society
and its activity,includes a goodnany expansions thatare measures of im-
poverishment rather thanenrichmet.In rociarn urban lifewe 'rork and pay
for things thatare free goods in amore primitive and rural setting,or
we pay high for thingsthat cone cheap undersimpler conditions,As man
develops beyond theprimitive tropicaleconomy, he outgrows thecapacity
to live by reachingout and gathering theproducts that nature furnishes
free.And his prepared foodssometimes lack needed elements, e spend
labor removing vitaminsfrom foodstuffs, andmore labor supplying the
man-made deficiency.Hospitals treat urbaninfections and cure the
Stomach-ulcers that come from thestrains of modern life.The science
that has brought vasteconomic growth is ending bythreatening to destroy
the humanrace,If the calamity of atomicor biological war isescaped,
there remains the costin conflict, sabotage andhatred, of the struggle
between hostile social systems,which are really rivalmethods of adapting
institutions to the changing techniquesthat have brought thisgreat
quantitative growth.
Our enlarging activities tiringa multitude of br-products,sor.e
welcome nd some the opposite.Few of us .rouldint to becosie savaeswith little to do tosupport lifeut sit under a palm-tree-- a cari-
cature, of course, of actualprimitive existence.Aside from getting
more goods, we accept amore active and laborious life as in itself
desirable.jid if put to it, we thould probthlyconcede that some of
the activities we engage in onlyfor ulterior purpose ('work') are better
for us than some of the activitieswe engage in for their own sakes
('playt or 'recreation'.)Conceivably, at certain stages or in certain
conditions, an irapoverishnient that forcesmen to greater activity to
neutralize its effects might bea great benefit to the race, by the best
standards we can muster.But from this stand1ioint, the changes inac-
tivity which have c ome with modern urban inc.ustryare of distinctly
thbjou character.jd the stresses of this age oI'cial-national-
racial conflict and reacjust.ment have long sinceexceeded what might be
welcomed as affording a healthy exercise forour political and social
S
In Toyribee's terms, we are facing one of those'chaflenges', which
a civilization is either barely able to net, or just not able.If we
survive, it will be because, on pain of perishing,we have been driven,
in fear and anguish, to make a majr advance in theart and structure
of civilized life,If we fail -- and failure is an ever-present threat
-- there will presumably follow an age as dark as that which followed
the downfall of Rome.Even if the race does not go back to stone axes,
it will witness the destruction of centuries of slow and costlyjrress
in freedom, truth, integrity and humanity, after which the slowprocess
will have to begin again.This threat is clearly a result of thesane
factors that have given us our great economic growth.Whether sonthinggood will come out of it,or only terrible evil, no one can be sure.
The upshot is thata yardstick of economic growth, which measures only
partly the fruits of economicactivities, and part'y the efforts and activi-
ties thenelves, is not thereforercessarily a wing standard as an index
of welfare; but neither is itnecessarily a right one.It depends mainly
on the ja1ity of the activities.
Perhaps it is uncalled-for to stress thispoint so much; but one must
anticite thaty such study as we are considering will, if it is success-
ful, inevitably furnish a yardstick that will be usedand abused by people
tho tend to accept itt its face value, and who have either no idea of its
limitations, or nothing like as clear an ideaas the investigators ho de-
vised the measuring-rod.
Under whatnditions might quantitative gro.th bea fair rough index
of real economic advance?If it includes comparatively few increases that
repesent impoverishment rather than enrinhmant, and comparatively few
changes that speii deterioration in the qualitr of activity; if something
is done to furnish ranedlies or offsets for the unfavorable changes; and if
some reasonable deduction is niade for
before the net result is presented in
as an index of economic improvement.
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the cost of these remedies or offsets,
a way that might cause it to be taken
If something of this sort cannot be
successfully done, then another way of dealing with the same difficulty
might be to let every page of the resulting study bear the legend, in red
letters,tlThjs is not an index of prcress or improvnt", and to make
a 8eparatstudy of those features of economic growth which are accepted
without controversy as representing improvnent, and let this tell its
own story.- 27 -
There is a specialreason for regarding more productionas in itself'
an index of' gain, aside fromour need for the end-products, inan economy
that must goon expanding or sufferunemploymt.The job itself is an
asset.But if that is the bestjustificatlon we can muster for the in-
creased production, itis a confession thatwe have not solved the problem
of' making rationaluse of our productivepower.It is probably a defect
of our national characterthat, if we can solvea problen, or stave it
off, by producing 'more ofthe same', we will prefer thattreatment to a
solution that calls forany change in our settled ways of doing things.
Though the latter kind of treatmentmight be nore enduring and fundamental,
it involves the risks ofbreaking new trails, and of treadingon many toes.
For example, at the peak ofa boom, we are making durable capital
outlays at a rate too fast to bemaintained by spontaneous demand.There
ra two remedies of the sort I have called'quantitative'.We could cut
down the excess capital outlaysat the boom level; and if we succeeded
we should be whittling down the boom.If this in turn escaped precipi-
tating a depression, it would probably levelactivity out at an average
between boom and depression.Then there would be the problem ofabsorbing
some chronic unemployment.Or, secondly, we could find work to keepthe
durable-capjtal-gooindustries working at something like boomlevels.
Ad all the while thisndition implies that we are creating fewercon-
suinption goods, or less leisure, or both, thanour economy could supply
if it were using its full productivepowers arid allocating them in pro-
portions that would be matched by sustained demand.But to find this
sustainable balance involves a difficult readjustment, withthe uncertain-
ties ,that go with change in our ways of distributing income,and in our- 28 -
system of incentives.The purelyquantitative solution is lessdisthrbing.
But enouof this digression.
3Dimensions of Growth
Several dimensionsof growthare indicated as sure to beused in such a
study; and thereare some that are less likelyto be used, but deserve
consideration,It will be worth-whileto look at thesedimensions and ask
what they areindexes of-- what economic conditions theyregister.
(1)Gross national product,deflated by somereasonably appropri-
ate price index.Presumably, the mostappropriate one would be neither
a straight wholesale priceindex nor a straightconsu1rr-goods retail
price index, butsome sort of combinatjon, includingcapital goods.It
includes, of course,replacements, or theexcess of gross capital forma-
tion over depreciation,and faces theoble, among others,whether the
orthodox allowancesare enough to Irintain realcapital under price in-
flation.It is a measure ofgross utilized economicpower.
(2)National income, net afterdeducting riacements,involves the
same problem,It also includes plusor minus balances dueon trans-
actions with othar countries,An outstanding instance ofa big discrep-
ancy introduced by this factor isBritain's present, comparedto its
prevar position,
(3)The same quantities,r capita or per adult consumingunit.
This is apparently the most pertinentindex of .tilizedpower available
for welfare' - with the qualificationsalready indicated.
(Li)Hours of work.Insofar as they may be less thansome standard
representing maximum production, the differencerepresents reserve eco-
nomic power available for emergencies.The maximum would differwithcreases in population of leading industrial countries in the past two
centuries raise serious problems of their long-rin reactions,some of
which are becoming visible.They may represent the fact that these
countries had capacity available for adaptation, some of whid-i has, toan
uncertain extent) been misused, so that theotential of improved adaptation
has not been realized, or only partially.Obviously, where per capita
measures are used, population appears in the denoninator of the index, not
the numerator.
For purposes of defense, a larger population than that of potential
- 29 -
different peoples anddifferent methods ofroduc tion, and would be different
for a shortemergency from what couldbe maintained usefullyover a longer
pull.It seems likely thathistorical changes in thismaximum are not free-
ly and completeireversible,This concept miit be broadenedto include
changes in the percentageof the populationeconomically employed.A
shortening of hoiis,or a reduction in theeconomically employed fraction
of the pooulatioii,may have tv.'o opposite mearLin.it. may represent a
voluntary division of thefniits of increasingprcuctiveness between more
goods and more leisure-- an index of capacity forreater welfare, if we
are wise enoudh to utilize it in thatwaOr it may nean failure to afford
opportunir for as much prociiiction ofgoods as people v:ould voluntarily
choose -- a minus qantityon the scale of v:elfare.
() Total populaLion of the economic unitstudied.Professor W. F.
Wilcox once suestec1 increasing densityof poJation as, in some much-
qualified 3ense, an irniex of increasing'adaptation'.The necessary quali-
fications are 'erious.Most students viould say it representspoorer
adaptation if it means merely increased Maithusianpressure.And the in-- 30 -
enemy countries is clearly an asset, ifit is not bought at the sacrifice
of per capita industrialpower.In relation to the theory of a tmature
economy', there is the highlycontroversial claim that increasing popu-
lation Is a benefit in making iteasier to stave off the dilemma which the
'mature economy' poses.This theory contains paradoxical elements, and on
its own showing can hardly bea permanent solution of the iroblem.
(6)Total area, or better, total economicresources, included in the
geographic unit studied.Change in this dimension is obviously an index
of expansion of one unit at the expense of the shrinking of others.It
is part of the picture, but raises all the questions of infiltration,
aggression and war.If this is a recognized method of growth, the obvious
way to promote it (or for intended 'victims to resist it) is to restrict con-
sumption and divert all possible resources to preparedness for war.From
the standpoint of welfare, comment is unnecessary.
More defensible, probably, would be an inc1e. of results achieved by an
economy in possession of a given area of basic resources or an index that
makes allowance for changes in this dimension.
LStages of Growth or Decline
As to conditionsof growth, I started with the assumption that these condi-
tions differ for different historical situations and that, while they may
have some common elements, they are probably to some extent unique to each
case, including the same country in different stages of its development,
and different countries in generally similar stages of developnEnt as well
as at different stages.
There is an early stage in which agriculture and extractive indus-
tries absorb a major part of economic effort, and when improvQllent in
S- 31 -
this area is the important thing,if only to afford a larger surplus above
minimum subsistence, whichmay be devoted to other types of production
which have greater potentialitiesof expansion.Then comes a stage in
which growth concentrates increasinglyon manufactures, escially when
one area can produce manufactured goods for export to otherareas, and can
acquire a population greater than itcan feed and supply with raw materials
from its own naturalresources.This in turn changes when other areas
increasingly develop their own manufacturing, especially ifthey protect it
by setting up trade barriers.There may be a stage in which it is true,
as so often said, that as other countries develop more manufacturing, a
country that has taken the lead in this developmentcan exchange more manu-
factured goods with them, and not less.But it seems clear that this is
not the final and universal word in this matter.Then comes a stage in
which, while manufacturing output may continue to increase, the nation
spends a smaller proportion of its total effort orit, and an increasing
proportion on what Cohn Clark has classified as ttertiaryt industries,
including professional, personal and governmental services.Here we have
an area in which quantitative measures become increasingly difficult to
apply with satisfactory meaning; quality becomes more and more the important
thing.Perhaps it is not necessary to spell out the proposition that the
conditions favorable to groth differ, at least in their relative emphasis,
at these different stages.
As to decline, it is often a relative matter -- relative to other econ-
omies that are expanding.If there is absolute decline, it seems not to
represent a simple reversing of the processes and conditions of growth.it
may be precipitated by sudden calamity, or may happen slowly, with gradual-32 -
climatic change, severeoverpopulation or exhaustion of resources, possibly
supplemented by stagnation of thetechnical progress by which these diff 1-
culties might be met and overcon.The case of Britain at present seems
rather exceptional, since she needs tomake a substantial and rapid in-
crease in production, while submitting toa decline in real income and
consumption, in order to balance her internationalaccounts, having
suffered losses of items that had previouslybalancedthem.But a declin-
ing economy does not return to themore jrir.itive states ithas left behind.
It retains the techniques It has once achieved; andits allocation ofre-
sources between primary, secondary and tertiary seemslikelyto be resistant
to retrogressive change.Though some such charge maytake place, especially
a shrinkage in tertiary industry, a country is not li1lytorevertto de-
voting most Df its resources to primary production.And a country which
has reached& fairly high level, and then declirs, seemslikelyto devote
serious efforts to diagnosing the causes ofthe declineand counteracting
them if possible, by deliberateefforts.
SConditioningFactors:Climate andNatural Resources
Climate and natural resourcesare basic; but it is acommonplace that favor-
able climate shifts from subtropical to temperatewith advancingtechniques;
andwith further advance, includingair-conditioninanpossible future
dims tic controls, and control of transmissiblediseases,the im1ortance
of natural climate may be much reduced.It is commonplace also that na-
tural resources are relative to a people's capacity to use them.Iron,
coal, bauxiteanduraniumacquire significance at diiferent stages of
technical development.From the standpoint of growth, theimportant condi-- 33 -
tions and resourcesare those that furnish the wherewithalfor the next step
of development, whatever thatmay be.
6Quality of the Population
Much the same is true of theparticular qualities and aptitudes of thepopu-
J.ation.it is commonplace that, withour harnessing of external per,
muscular strength hasdiminishingimportance, though it has not becone
obsolete, evenin oursystem.The qualities in the population whichare
favorable to growth interlock also with thesystem of social controls of
productive methods, among other things.Where rigid controls make methods
highly static, the qualities that make for innovationget a chance only at
certainpoints.Iassume that in MedievalEurope,there was, on the whole,
more chance in handicrafts than in agriculture, and perhaps in the latter
part of the period more in transport and navigation.
But on the whole, in this priod, the place where thingswere happening
that were to lead to later material innovations was in the realm of scholar-
ship and rudimentary pure science,'.eherefrcinquiry was gradually loosen-
ing the shackles that held it.In promoting techniques, the monasteries were
important.Later, under early nationalism, national governments were import-
ant, at least in importing and diffusing techniques developed elsewhere.
Later again, as small-scale businessenterprisedeveloped, diffused ingenuity
and enterprise became important; and later still, innovation became depart-
mentalized into pure science, applied science, the woodshed inventor, the
ingenious manual worker and the entrepreneur in all his guises (including
the farmer and the public administrator) defining him for this purpose as
the one who selects, adopts, rejects and promotes, from among the suggestions- 34 -
thatcome from all the availablesources.
As the processproceeds, education becomesa more important factor;
at first for the fewwho act as leaders,then for themy who must kn
how to use andoperate an acceleratingflow of ever-newcontrivances, and
finally the educationnecessary for the universal1yhjghstandards of
economic citizenshipwithout which the moderninterdependent. economy
cannot be run successfully-- except on a ba1 of undemocratic regimen-
tation.This education isa matter that goes far beyondthe school system,
and needs to continuethroughout one's active life.
This brings us to themoral qualities of the population.First come
the qualitiesnecessary for the Successful continuedoperation of a system,
at its existing level oftechnique, then come those needed forits growth
to a higher level.The second do not displacethe first, since the system
needs to hold together thile itis advancing.The exceptions-- cases of
fundamental social revolution-- seem rare enough to prove the rule; and
even Lenin is said to have remarked atone stage of the Russian revolution
that, now that the proletariat hadtaken over the place and tasks ofthe
former bourgeoisie, they must. cultivatethe bourgeois virtues,In a highly-
static society, the qualities needed forcontinued operation seem to be
mainly conventional leadershipon the part of the few, and docile conformity
for the many,In the individualistic stage they includea less conventional
leadership, and respect for propertj rights, whichcould make terms with
a more widespread readiness to try novel things in the realm oftechnique.
In the stage we have reached now, the recjuireents becomevastly
more exacting.There is need of loyalty, but not docility; and loyalty
to the whole comjnurtjtr must be effective in the face ofconflicting loyal-- 35
ties to closer andsmallergroups, more closelyrelated to the members'
personal self-interest.This isnecessary to economicgrowt.h, not so much
because loyaltyitself furnishesthe positiveincentive to improvements,
but primarilybecause itserves to maintain inworking order the system
under which otherIncentives can work.And it is becomingan open question
whether a systembased onself-interest canconmiend the kind and degreeof
loyalty that hasbecome necessary tothis end.If not, this factmay out-
weigh the many andstrong advanta2esof the privateenterprise system from
the standpoint ofincentives to growth.A higher degree ofdemocratic
capacity is required,on a larger scale thanever before; becausenever
before have we had tohandle, on sucha large scale, decisions thataffect
economic interestsso directly and decisively,And the whole population
needs to share this highquality.
Loyalty is a two-sIdedaffair, requiringa population willing to be
loyal and susceptibleto available appeals,and a system ofa sort cap-
able of inspiringor commanding loyalresponses,The conmon elementsmay
take different fojand are combined inwidely-different proportionsunder
different systems.They may be listedas including myth, religion,philosophy
or 'ideology?, cultural andsocial activities andcontacts, human relations
on the job, appeals to self-interestarid coercion,Religion for thispur-
pose is construed broadly enough toinclude the anti-religiousreligion of
Soviet Russia, and philosophyincludes that of the professionalphilosophers,
but only to the extentthat it filters down into theattitudes of the people
at large, or at least to theattitudes of leaders to whom thepeople re-
spond, and who det.ermineor influence the character of the system,
From this standpoint, the de;iocraticsystem may he facinga dilemma,gressively than he might if he were an official ofa collectivist govern-
ment - always provided his record in furnishing jobs isnot too inadequate.
That does not solve all questions, but itmay afford a basis for at least
preventing the democratic dilemma from turning intoan impossible impasse.
More specifically, progress must not be paralyzed by output-limiting
rules; and to that end it must be handled in such ways that it viii not
bring calamity upon numerous groups, and so drive them to outout-lirniting
rules for what appears necessary protection.For exanle, are we better
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If the system 13, or is feltto be, owiied by thepeople at large and
operated for their benefit,they or theirorganized groups, may exploit
it to an extent thatcripples it for renderingthem the ever-increasing
benefits they demand, andso may defeat their own ends. ut if it is, or
is felt to be, ownedand operated for the benefitof a privileged few, the
people may cripple it byrefusing their loyalcooperation.The only visible
way out of this dilemma, if itarises, is some kind of authority-- call it
an undemocratic element ifyou please -- authority either withoutprivilege
or without the kind and degreeof privilege that is felt to beexploitive
to an extent that vitiates the authority.'The boss must be felt to bean
1The bestexample I have encountered, ofauthority without privilege is
that of the Eskimo whoexplained that, because he wasa chief, he had to
work harder than others, toaccumulate food enough to furnish the hospi-
tality which his positionrequired of him.In less simple communities,
authority and privilegeseem more nearly inseparable.
effective servant of commonly-approvedends, and his privileges acquiesced
in as natural accompaniments ofthis function.I suspect that the majority
of organized labor in this country do feelthat, under the pressures of
collective bargaining, the bosscan be made to work for them as well as for
himself, and that he works for themon the whole more effectively and pro-- 37 -
off than the British-- for the moment-- in this respect, because this
jrocess of protective ruleshas not goneso far dth us, and the pressure
of private enterjse-- with whatever of competitive forcerr.y be back
of it -- has resistedsuch rtiles on the wholemore successfully?In a
document suchas this, it is obviouslyimpossible to do more than scratch
the surface of thismajor social question ofthe conditions and varieties
of loyalty,
Before leaving thequestion of the quality of thepopulation, it seems
worth while to nntiona matter that is not a very live presentissue, but
may become so, with advancingknowledge:namely, the qistJon of biological
quality,It has been fashionablerecently to assume that thereare no
biological differences betweenindividuals or groups withina population,
chiefly because we do not. atpresent know enough about them toprove such
ideas as we may have.This seems an inadequate and unsafebasis for con-
clusions, and theorc probable hypothesis aopears to be that thereare
such differences:that some hereditary strainsare better and more capable
than ethers.It seeas fair to assume that successfultypes have, on the
average, traits that furnish a basis for high caac!ty, tnoughit is
equally likely that types that are relativelyunsuccessful, by the stand-
arcis and under the conditions of a particular socialsystem, may also
possess qualities which are valuable and could be successful ina different
setting.
It seems highly likely that differences in the rate of increase of
different hereditary strains are important:that economic advancement
may be promoted by favorable selection and vice versa, that declinemay
be the penalty for failure of good strains to maintain themselves.t- 38 -.
would follow thata civilizationcan suffer throughbiological suicide of
auth strains,or more rapidly throughtheir exile or liquidation,Mere
success in a given systemis an imperfectand undependthle standardof
valuable quality.And SOCiallyva1uablequalities are not unit biolog-
ical characters, hutdepend on combinationsof differentgenes, in ways
about which we knowtoo little atpresent to sjeak or actconfidently.
But such knowledgemay grow,
7Incentives
Another topic too largeto cover is that ofincentives,There the indivi-
dual produces for himselfand his family, there islittle problem; but
also little chance forgro7th.In primitive Eocie ties withrudimentary
division of labor, motivesof social prestige andconformity seen to play
a large part; but here againthere is little room forgrowth.The great
volume of economic growthhas come under systems ofindividualistic incen-
tives; which are not to bethought of as coextensive withmaterial self-
interest, but are really complexcombinations of different kinds of
opportunities and appeals.One tentative a taternerjt of principlemight be
that inoportion as te objects towikichgrowing economic power shall
be devoted are left to bedetermjrd by individual preferences,the
appropriate incentives are t.he kind thatindividuals can offer-- namely,
material inducements offered in exchange;since the general run of single
individuals are not in a position to turnon or off the great forces of
social approval or disapproval, and the multiplicityof goods and services,
and people's differences of taste and judnent aboutthen would confuse
the issue.This means j'incipal reliance on rewards, not penalties.In
proportion as growth is directed to a socially-predeterminedset of goals,- 39 -
it becomes possible tomake more use of socialapproval and disaproval,
and penalty--incentives,in matters of specific andpositive performance,
rather than reserving themmainly to deter pople from doingactual wrong,
as under the individualistic system.
8Capital
Ajiiong material conditions,one of the foremost is a supply of capital,or
of power to produce it,adequate to the next steps in advancingtechniques.
Along with this go the financialinstitutions necessary for making the
capital available and mobilizingit.This amounts to saying that, given
openings for the use of increased capital,supply and ways of making it
available are important; but the openings foruse are presumably more
crucial.They may exceed or fall shrt of the voluntarysavings-potential
of the economy.If they exceed it, the potential rate ol' grithis limited
unless other sources than voluntary savingsare provided, under a five-year
plan or otherwise.If openings fall short of voluntary savings-potential,
there is danger of stagnation.The first dificu1ty is characteristic of
a poor country or one faced with a sudden need for extraordinary expansion;
the second is a difficulty to which a rich country may be exposed inthe
absence of such special need for expansion, or of successful counter-measures
of a deliberate sort.
For a quick expansion, existence of reserve productive capacity, in
the form of fixed cauital, is a facilitating factor.But for the kind of
long-term expansion ihich depends on qualitative improvement in the
efficiency of production, a heavy fixed invesient in specialized facilities,
which would be superseded by the new method, can be a retarding factor, un-
less there is sufficiently strong pressure, from competition or otherwise,to enforce areadiness to scrapexisting equiment.If capital charges on
such expendableequipment are 20 percentof total cost of 'value added1,it
takes a largerpercentage economr in directoperating costs to make up for
the loss fromretiring physical1yusab1eequipmt, and replacing it that
if these capiLalcharges are only 10percent of total costs.More strictly,
there are prthablycircumstances in which the costof unexpended value of
the old equipment isa Pertinent factor, and others inwhich it is only the
costs on account of thenew equipment which replaces it, thatcount in the
reckoning; but in eithercase the heavy capital investhent.appears to be a
force making forconservatism.This force can be increasedor diminished
by tax laws.
9Institutional Conditions and 5ytems
As to institutional conditions,gro'th can take place under widely-different
institutional systems. nd it is not a very hazardous generalizationto
conclude that different kinds of gwthare favored by different kinds of
institutional frameworks,It is difficult to see how the exuberantexpansion
of this countr"r in t1e nineteenthcentury could have been brought about under
anything but an individualistic system, whichalso accounts for vast wastes
and destructiveness.As for Russia since 1911, it may be debatable
whether she could have equalled her quantity ofexpansion under some other
system, with the help of foreign loans.But if it was to be mainly autar-
chic, it seems quite probable that thenecessary abstinence coult have
been secured only ona compulsory basis.
It sens likely that a strongly-individualistic system willultimately
encounter decline unless its individualin is balanced by controls tocon-
serve essential social assets, including the inpondrable asset which-LU -
centers in the individual'ssense of a stake ina community vthich cai be
trusted to treat himas a member of acommunity should be treated,taking
care and responsibility forhis access tooppor1nity, and for his fate if
major calamity strikeOr if the system isan authority with complete
control, it secmmsmorally certain to sufferheavily from corruption,waste
and bureaucraticstagnation, unless it iseither driven by sucha paramount
motive as national defons,or possesses a powerfulmotivating "ideology",
amounting to a religion,which commands the activeloyalty of those who play
roles of leadership andresponsibility, and at least thepassive acquiesc-
ence of tFie 'underlying population'in such a regimentedsystem.One danger
is that suchan ideology may impair basicscientific research by interfering
with freedom of inquiry,to the long-tens detrinntof economic progress.
As to whether an aristocraticor a democratic system ismore favorable
to growth, once more itappears that the answer must be:"It dependsl.
Growth centering in fine handicrafts,with a lar[:e placQ for the finearts,
seems to be favored by an aristocratic system ofthe leisure-class variety;
but such a system would bean effective barrier to the kind of grth
represented by modern mass-production, whichrequires widely-diffused mass
consuming-power.Aj-id the modern type of system is at least relatively,and
probably absolutaly, unfavorable to the developuentor maintenance of handi-
crafts; largely because their products becot weilnighprohibitively ex-
pensive, compared to machine-made substitutes. ther an aristocratic
system is favTable to gro;th or not wouldseeii to icond also on the
character of the aristocracy:on whether it is interested in sw'h things,
and on whether it is vigorous or effete.If it is mainly interested in
war, industry may suffer; but even that is too simple a generalization,- L2 -
since war, withits massed demandfor identicalmunitions,has been respon-
sible for notablesteps in thedevelopment ofmass-production and inter-
changeable parts-- chiefly after the introductionof firearms and national
armies.
Itseems probable that therehave been stages inwhich national growth
has been promoted byhigh profits,ained at the expense ofdegrading ex-
ploitation of labor,including early stages ofthe industrial revolution
when prices wererising and moneywages failed to keep pace.In the
handicraft stage, ;iithan aristocracythat viill consumeall that can be
produced, such exploitiveprosperitmight he well-sustained; Outin the
stage offact'y-productjon, it wouldseto depend to averylarge extent
on finding a market for tjroduct abroad. Uhenproductivity outgrows this
resource, it has also outgrown theposs ibilitr of jro sj erity basedon the
laborof a working-classso impoverishedthat. they cann.t themselves afford
a substantial market for the p'oductsthey create.Fromthen on, prosperity
must be based on widely-diffusedconsuIninb-pover.
10Types of Grth
Much of what might be said under thisheading has already been suested
in connection with othertopics.Long-runexpansion isa matter of popu-
lation-groyrth and the long-run trend of increasedproductivity.They have
tlir vicissitudes, but seem to be fairly steadyexcept in tinEs of major
wars.As already indicated, such growth may be directed toivinthe
people whatever they may individually want,or it may be concentrated on
specific community or governmental ends, generally militarypower and
national prestige.- L13 -
On the other hand,there may berather sudden demandsfor rapid growth
to meet therequire8 ofsome new situation,amounting to an emergency,
This generallycalls formore rapid grcwththan individualismbringsabout.
Or if indjvjcJua1jmcould be trustedto respond tothe emergency demandwith
adequatevolume of output,still it vould bec'ividing itsenergies between
producing goods tomeet the nationalneed, and producingsuperfluities and
luxuries for theproducers themselvestospend their swollenincons on --
superfluities whichdetract from themeeting of the nationalemergency rather
than contribute toit, ar isan obvious example, andalso the postwar
einergiiey conditj,)ns ofthe Europeancountriesthathave suffered most heavily.
Growth of thisEmergency sort requirespositive controls of the)planningl
variety, while greithof the other sortcan easily be lefton an individual-
istic basis, if thenecessary basic conditionsare present,
Some kinds of grovithare sound arid self-sustainingand others are based
on a wasting of the heritageof resources that isbound to make them tem-
porary.Some examples can be easilyclassed as destructiveor parasitic;
the difficulty is tobe surethatthere are any modernexamples of growth
which may not, in thelight of hindsight, turnout to have been of that
character,All are based on utilizationof non-reproduciblenatural re-
sources; all are to soie extent builton uti1jzinthe naturalresources
of lessevelopedareas, in ways that may be mutuallyhelpfdl for as long
a future as it is pertinent to thinkabout, or may tunm out tobe parasitic
and temp'ary,It secns that Europe, that tinycorner of thear' s
surface, grew andosoered off the naturalresources of other and larger
areas; and that now all the wld is trin toiitate that lray ofpros-
perity, while its food-production failsto keup pace with thegrowth ofpopulation,Forthe world asa whole, it appears thatone of the urgent
requisites for avoiding declineis theconservation of our wasting heritage
of food-producing soil.Presumably it will besome time hence, if ever,
that we shall be able to dowithout the soil,andfeed ourselves with
syntheticchemicals.In the meantime,growth based on concentrated indus-
trialism nay be regardedas unbalanced and vulverable,
11Conclusion
It is naturally ioss1ble toexhaust the subject.The above are a few
explorations, depending largelyon facts of fairly common knowledge, and
with no serious attempt to checkand verify the hypotheses presented,These
are to be regarded as tentative,as is appropriate in a session concerned
with charUng questions which subsequentresearch may try to answer.In
general, I have presentedevidence forthe thesis that conditions favorable
to growth are different at differentstagesin the developnnt of the tech-
niques of production,orunder different social orpoliticalsystems, or for
different kinds of growth, spontaneousor forced by pressure of emergency;
andthatgrowth may be sound or unsound self-sustainingor temporary and
parasitic in various wajs, sore or which can be identified with theaid of
historic hindsight, but some of which are bound to renainopen to conjecture.
There seems to be no danger that research will answer all the questions that
confront us in connection with this subject.